



IED-TM Module

IED Fundamentals





Overview

1.1 Definition of IEDs and Components of an IED

1.2 Why IEDs are used in modern conflict.

1.3 IED incidents in UN Missions (Case studies)



1.1 Definition of IEDs and Components of an IED



Terminal Learning Objectives


Each student will understand and discuss components that are used in making IEDs

Definition of an IED:

*A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating **destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals** and designed to **destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract**. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components*

UNMAS Lexicon Definition

Components of an IED:



Components of an IED:

IED Components

Power Source


Iniator

Explosive (main charge)

Container

Enhancements

Switches



Power Source

A device that stores or releases electrical or mechanical energy. Used to provide power to the electrical initiator.

Common TTPs:-

- ✓ Batteries are deeply buried under the main charge to avoid ease of detection.
- ✓ Switch sometimes taped to the power source and/or Main Charge.
- ✓ Power Sources can be offset from other IED components to either:
 - ✓ Reduce likelihood of detection by metal detectors;
 - ✓ Allow emplacement of all other components without arming and last minute arming upon approach of a target.



12V Motorcycle Battery



6V Motorcycle Battery



9V Battery used in PBIEDs

Initiators (detonators)

- **Source**
- **Categorization**
 - ✓ Commercial
 - ✓ Military
 - ✓ Improvised
- **Method of function**
 - ✓ Electric
 - ✓ Non-electric



Explosive (Main Charge)

Explosive (main charge) forms the largest component of the IED. The extent of the effect depends on the size of the quantity of main charge used; the larger the component the greater the effect/damage.

There are 3 main sources of high explosives which can be used in making IEDs;


- **Commercial explosive:**
- **Military explosive.**
- **Home Made explosive.**



Military explosive



Commercial explosive



Home Made explosive

HME in Syria




Explosive (Main Charge)

- An **IED Container** is any item with a void within it, into which the other components of an IED are placed. IED containers can simply contain components of an IED or can also act to **conceal** the components and / or **confine** the explosive material of the IED which can produce direction effects.
- There are various forms of containers used by threat actors in **transportation** and **emplacement** of IEDs. Containers can be used for explosive use only or to carry more than one component of the IEDs.
- An IED typically looks like whatever the container it uses. Anything that has a void in it can in theory be used as an IED container.




Example of containers

- **Plastic Containers** – 5 litre Milk Container & Yellow Oil Drums
- **Small Metal Boxes** - UVIED
- **Military Ordnance (MILORD)**
- **Vehicles (VBIED)**
- **Machined containers** for directional effects
 - Directional Fragmentation Charges (DFC)
 - Improvised Claymores (IC)
 - Platter charges
 - Explosive Formed Projectile (EFP)
- **Vests** – used by PBIED




Switches

- A device for making, breaking, or changing a connection in an IED. A single switch can have multiple functions (i.e., firing and arming)
 - a. **Firing switch**- The component that initiates the explosion train.
 - b. **Arming switch**- A switch that prevents an IED from arming until an acceptable set of criteria has occurred and subsequently effects arming and allows functioning.





- **Firing Switch** – always present
- **Arming Switch** – may be present as a safety feature

Types of Switches



Command Switch

- An IED fired by command gives aggressors the means to attack a specific target from a safe distance at the moment when the explosion will have best effects. Command IEDs are especially suited to attacking moving targets. To implement an attack using a command IED, the aggressors need to be able to select two locations: the **contact point** where the IED will be placed; and the **firing point** from where to command to fire.




Time Switch

- Time initiated is the method by which an IED self initiates after a predetermined delay. This is achieved through the use of mechanical, electronic and non-electric timers.
- The effectiveness of a time initiated IED relies heavily on accurate predictions by the aggressors of the intended target's time of presence at the emplacement location.
- An IED triggered by time allows insurgents to be at a safe distance from the explosion, and to escape the scene before any security response. The disadvantage of time IEDs is that the intended victims might not be close to the IED when it explodes.



Victim operated firing switches



Connection
Cables

Securing/joining
metal sheets

Insulated
conducting
lever bar

Wooden
Plates

Contact
point



Waterproofing
polythene

- When pressure is applied on top of the plate, contact of the insulated sheet of metal and spring is established at the end points and hence completion of the electrical circuit which then initiates the device.

Enhancement

- An optional, deliberately added components (as opposed to secondary hazard) which modifies the effect of an IED. The IED would be effective, yet produce a different measurable result if enhancements are not added
- Enhancements are also considered a characteristic of a container
- Indicators/Observables - The following indicators could be evidence of efforts to enhance IEDs:-
 - **Fragmentation** such as ball bearings, nuts, bolts, washers, nails, bullets, shell casings, scrap metal, rocks, glass, etc.
 - **Gas cylinders & containers** – Compressed Propane, Oxygen, Acetylene and other gases, intended to increase blast, thermal and / or fragmentation effects.
 - **Liquid Gasoline, diesel and paraffin** in plastic or metal containers could be present as an attempt to give the IED a greater blast and/or thermal effect.



Ball bearings



Ball bearing mixed with explosive



Quiz

1. Name the components of an IED
 - *Power source, Initiator, Explosive material (Main charge), Container, Switch and Enhancements (optional)*
2. Name sources of explosive used to make IEDs ?
 - *Military, commercial and Home Made Explosive.*
3. Name type of switches
 - *Command, Time, Victim operated*
4. Give examples of containers
 - *Plastic containers, small metal boxes, MILORD, vehicles, machined containers, vests*



1.2 Why IEDs are used in conflict



Terminal Learning Objectives

Each student will understand why IEDs are used in modern conflict

Triggers & Longer-term drivers of conflict

- Corruption - corrupt, abuse of power, authoritarian or repressive governments / officials
- Sense of Injustice / Repression
 - Rigged Elections
 - Bias Leaders
 - Exclusion, discrimination or marginalisation within society
 - Lack of fair and equal representation / power sharing
- Overpopulation
 - Population growth leading to migration and poverty
- Climate change
 - Forced Migration
 - Competition for scarce resources
 - Food Insecurity
- Unemployment / Joblessness
 - Poverty
 - Lack of hope and bleak outlook leading to desperation




Why IEDs are used in conflict

- **Cheap, easy** to build and emplace-information on the internet.
- **Low** risk, **high pay off** (Highly effective).
- **Tactical** weapon with **strategic** effect-maximum propaganda effect.
- IED aggressors avoid **surfaces** (strengths) and goes for **gaps** (weakness).
- Ability to achieve element of **surprise**.



IED System


- The IED system adopted by aggressors or non-state actors may or may not be structured. It involves multiple actions from the collection and procurement of material for IED manufacturing to the placement of the IED at the point of attack. It can require elaborate planning and resources; including personnel, technical expertise and IED making material.
- The actual IED attack is just one part of the whole system. IED systems are most effectively categorized according to three recurring phases: resource and plan; execute and analyse





When attack occurs

Significant persons / material / activity have been targeted



Vulnerable points / observable patterns identified

Materials, manpower & expertise available

insufficient capability to launch attack

building up to an attack

conditions are suitable for an attack



1.3 IED incidents in UN Missions (Case studies)



Terminal Learning Objectives

Each student will have an
overview of IED incidents in some
UN Missions

Peacekeeping Operations



IED The Global Threat - Peacekeeping

- Current operations
- World view
- UN Resolutions




Mali



IED System in Mali – Terrorist Network


The Salafi-jihadi Base in the Sahel





Source: neo4j

IED System in Mali – Terrorist network

- Organisation
- Financing
- Recruitment
- Resources




IED System in Mali – Regions 2020




IED System in Mali – Categories

IED Incident by Category in 2019





IED Incident by Category in 2020




- **VOIED, RCIED & Mine are the main types of device used in Mali in 2020.**
- *Items in Other category:* approximately 70% are VOIED and 30% are Command IED, but this cannot be confirmed due to the lack of Post Blast Investigation (PBI) at many scenes.

Evolution of IED threat in MONUSCO (DR Congo)




Evolution of IED threat in MONUSCO (DR Congo)

- IED incidents located in North Kivu and Ituri province in Eastern DRC.
- Significant increase in the number of IEDs reported in 2021.
- First PBIED incident reported on 27 June 2021. The second PBIED incident reported on 25 Dec 2021.
- The incidents are linked to ADF who have allegiance to IS.



IED Threat in MONUSCO (DR Congo)

- Allied Democratic Force (ADF) is one of the oldest and resilient terrorist group.
- Established in 1995 in Uganda. The group been involved with mass kidnapping and murder of civilians.
- Designated as global terrorist organization in 2001.
- Military action by Uganda security pushed the group to DRC in 1996.
- From 2017, relationship with Islamic State became apparent through video pledge by ADF leader. Referred by IS as Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP).
- Some IED marking “ Made by Dawlah” and “Guerilla war”. al-Dawla means State.



Marking in IED in North Kivu,
July 2019



Marking in IED in
Kasinga, North Kivu, June
2019

IED Threat in MONUSCO (DR Congo)

- IED incidents located in North Kivu and Ituri province in Eastern DRC. Kenya has QRF deployed to Beni.
- IEDs observed in the context of guerrilla operations and carried out in forest or jungle environment where ADF operate.
- Significant increase in the number of IEDs reported in 2021.
- First PBIED incident reported on 27 June 2021. The second PBIED incident reported on 25 Dec 2021.
- The incidents are linked to ADF who have allegiance to IS.



CW IED in Kalemie, 14 Feb 2006



CWIED, Madian 01 Feb 20



RC IED, Beni 26-27 June 21



RC IED, Oicha 05 Jan 22



QUESTIONS ?



IED-TM Module IED-Threat Assessment and TTPs





Terminal Learning Objectives

Each student will understand and discuss IED-Threat Assessment and Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) in IED- Threat Environment



Overview

2.1 Introduction to IED- Threat Assessment

2.2 IED-Threat Environment: Vulnerable Points (VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA) Assessment

2.3 5-25 m Check and 5Cs drills by Tactical Forces

2.4 Local Cultures and Influences in ERW/IED Laden Environments



Overview

2.5 Understand safe response to IED and Mine strike during mounted and dismounted operations

2.6 Issuing a Threat Assessment to Tactical Force

2.7 Route analysis and convoy planning procedures

2.8 Information flow, reporting of IED threat, analysis and exploitation




2.1 Introduction to IED- Threat Assessment


Introduction to IED Threat Assessment :

- Threat actors use IEDs as a tool to prevent security forces from operating freely and thus creating a security vacuum which they fill and provide “security”.
- IED use has certain characteristics & patterns. These are repeated by threat actors – depending on their aims, beliefs and *modus operandi*.

Understanding IED Threat:



Understanding IED Threat:



Understanding IED Threat:

IED Related Incidents

IED; Explosion; Find/ Cache; Turn-in

*Accurate &
In-depth
Information*

Informs

Tactical Characterisation

Identifying:

- *Tactical Design*
 - *Why here, Why now & Why in this Way?*
- *Device Purpose*
 - *Incident Outcome*
 - *Intended Outcome*

Leads to

Event Signature Development


The process of analysing the tactical identifiers of an IED incident in support of TTP development, Force Protection Measures & Mobility Planning

Feeds into


Trend & Pattern Analysis

IED SYSTEM:

- The IED system adopted by aggressors or non-state actors may or may not be structured. It involves multiple actions from the collection and procurement of material for IED manufacturing to the placement of the IED at the point of attack. It can require elaborate planning and resources; including personnel, technical expertise and IED making material.
- The actual IED attack is just one part of the whole system. IED systems are most effectively categorized according to three recurring phases: resource and plan; execute and analyse.



The Pouliquen Model of an IED System's Personnel





2.2 IED-Threat Environment: Vulnerable Points (VP) and Vulnerable Areas (VA) Assessment



Enabling Learning Objectives

Explain vulnerable / checkpoints and notional requirements from higher headquarters needed to support tactical force movement.



Vulnerable / Check Point Requirements



- UN personnel are particularly vulnerable to IED attacks when conducting patrols or travelling in convoys.
- The application of simple but effective Counter IED principles and procedures can greatly reduce the possibility of an effective IED attack.



Operational Level Support


- Understanding
- Pursuing
- Preventing





Mission Planning

- Check previous routes used
- Map reconnaissance
- Include the time to check
- Include extra time
- Remember to vary your timings





Vulnerable Points



- Security forces are vulnerable when they are forced to use a predictable route
- Security forces are vulnerable when they are forced to slow down making us an easier target for command devices
- Security forces are vulnerable in areas of previous attacks

Definition of VPs and VAs:

- **A *Vulnerable Point (VP)*** is a specific point where it is particularly advantageous for an aggressor to position an ambush, using either IEDs, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) or both. VP are typically characterized by prominent or restrictive feature or choke point on the ground. Several factors pertaining to aggressor ***capability, intent, opportunity*** and local factors will contribute to the vulnerability of a specific point.
- **A *Vulnerable Area (VA)*** is an area where the ground lends itself to IED or SALW attack.

IEDs Against Mobile Targets

- While there are various locations that are considered to be VPs and VAs, the two most important characteristics are locations where a target is canalised into a particular route of location and / or forced to slow down or stop.
 - **Canalisation** – allows an aggressor know the path a target will travel.
 - **Slow down or stop** – allows an aggressor initiate an IED at the optimal moment to maximise target effects

IEDs will be placed in areas where they are most likely to be successful
known as VP and VA locations

Aggressor Requirements

For Command IED to be successful the following characteristics of an attack location will have greater chances of success

Contact Point:


- Concealment of IED with low IED indicator signature
- Predictability in the actions of the intended target at that point – **canalisation** in their movement
- Target to **slow down or stop** at that point
- Maximum effect
- Aiming marker

Firing Point:

- Line of Sight
- Prominent marker
- Concealment from observation
- Firing range within range of transmitter.

Escape route:

- Route of movement away from the firing point to a safe location / area
- Concealment of this route from observation from the contact point



VULNERABLE POINTS

PREVIOUS ATTACK SITES- IED HOT SPOTS

- A previous IED attack at a particular location is evident that all necessary conditions were present at that time. This is why aggressors have chosen and continue to use them.
- When a number of IED attacks occur at the same location, they are often referred to as “IED Hotspots”.
- The analysis tool of heat mapping using different colours to visually depict areas of higher IED activity in an area of consideration is very useful.




VULNERABLE POINTS

APPROACH TO FRIENDLY LOCATIONS

Whenever a base location is established, it is necessary for logistical resupplies and operational deployment to enter and exit the base.

- There are limited number of approaches to a base.
- Aggressor can emplace an IED on these approaches as they are routes of **canalisation**.
- Increasing the number of approaches and entry points a base has and if their use is varied randomly, the vulnerability of such approaches can be reduced,
- However, additional security requirements as an increased number of entry points require additional assets to protect them from attack.



VULNERABLE POINTS

CURRENT AND PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED POSITIONS

- Not all positions used by security force personnel are manned continually and are abandoned for periods of time and then reoccupied, e.g.

- Defensive positions out from a main base location that is only manned at certain times e.g. first light and last light.
- Check Point (CP) only occupied for periods of high security e.g. Vehicle Check Point (VCP) at key urban points.
- A previously occupied position is abandoned due to aggressor action and later retaken. It is common practice to boobytrap such positions by retreating forces i.e. emplace IEDs.

N o	Year	Incident in Host Nation FOB	IED
1	2017	25 June, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	
2	2018	7 June, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES
3	2018	25 August, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	
4	2018	15 October, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES
5	2018	1 December, Host Nation vacate the FOB due to political issues allowing to occupy the position	
6	2019	17 August, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	
7	2020	25 March, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES
8	2020	5 August, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES

VULNERABLE POINTS

CURRENT AND PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED POSITIONS



CHECKPOINT



CHECKPOINT

Current or previously occupied position needs to be searched & cleared of IEDs prior to reoccupation

VULNERABLE POINTS

CULVERTS

- Entry and exit points are similar to approaches to friendly force locations, as they are points of *canalisation* that you are forced to pass through, however there are some added considerations as they are vulnerable to an IED attack in the following ways:
 - An IED can be emplaced if the entry / exit point is not being monitored;
- Entry to a base though such a vulnerable point can be slow leaving a vehicle *stopped* at the VP.



VULNERABLE POINTS

RIVER CROSSING POINTS & BRIDGES

- Bridges are build across rivers because surrounding area is impassable. River crossing points and bridges over rivers, wadis, ditches and valleys force those using them to use pre-defined routes i.e. ***canalised routes***.
- At crossing points where there is no solid surface such as non-bridged wadi, stream and river crossing points the surface will be soft making emplacement easier and possibly the wetness allow for lower ground signs of IED emplacement.
- Stream beds are good to emplace IEDs in low water or rocky areas.



Songobia Bridge, Mali

VULNERABLE POINTS

RIVER CROSSING POINTS & BRIDGES



VULNERABLE POINTS

INTERSECTION & JUNCTIONS

- Intersections and junctions are points on a route at which vehicles are forced to ***slow down or stop*** due to traffic or to avoid an accident.
- Such VP offer an aggressor
 - Slow moving or static target
 - Compacted targets
 - Predictable target actions at this location



Intersection

VULNERABLE POINTS

SHARP TURNS

- Sharp turns on routes are points where vehicles are forced to ***slow down*** to avoid coming off the road or turning the vehicle over, making target engagement easier for an aggressor.



Sharp turn

VULNERABLE POINTS

CHOKE POINTS

Choke points are locations in which the terrain or an obstacle does not allow the free movement through it and requires the use of pre-defined route i.e. they are points of **canalisation** which an aggressor can exploit. Movement being restricted to a specific route through man made or natural obstacles in your way. Examples of areas of canalisation include:

- Rocks, fallen trees or broken down vehicles on the route
- The entry / exit to a valley or pass
- A gap in a wall




IED on a choke point in Timbuktu Mali

VULNERABLE POINTS

SLOPES – UPHILL AND DOWNHILL


When moving uphill and downhill the view of the personnel travelling within such vehicles is naturally elevated above the route being travelled making the detection of IED indicators such as ground signs more difficult. This can be exploited to the advantage of those who emplace IEDs.

Uphill and downhill slopes also force a reduction in speed i.e. **slow down**, in order to maintain control, which makes it easier to effectively initiate an IED at such locations.





Basic Principles prior to movement



- Plan the route in advance using all available information:
 - Maps
 - Imagery
 - Previous patrol reports
 - Previous incident Reports
- If possible identify VPs in advance and plan accordingly



Basic Principles during movement

Units must vary:

- Their timings
- Routes/Destinations
- Information security
- Record routes of mission





Basic Principles during movement

Dispersal:

- Ensure there is space between vehicles to react to incidents (Approx 25m)
- Ensure any specialist equipment (mine detectors etc) is dispersed among the convoy
- Do not overload vehicles





Basic Principles during movement

- Ensure all equipment is fitted securely inside and outside of vehicle
- Use Personal Protective Equipment (including seat belts)
- Ensure crew served weapons are manned
- Check communications before deployment
- Understand emergency procedures





Quiz

1. Name some of the Vulnerable Points along a route
 - *Previous attack points, current and previous occupied positions, Culverts, Bridges, Intersections, sharp turns, uphill/downhill of slopes.*

2. What forms of information should be used when planning a route?
 - *Maps, Imagery, Previous patrol reports, Previous incident Reports.*



2.3 5-25 m Check and 5Cs drills by Tactical Forces



Enabling Learning Objectives

State the 5Cs and 5-25 metre drills and explain how they may be employed by tactical forces.

5-25 m check

Approved for Public Release


5-25 m search

The 5 and 25s dismount drill provides a level of assurance that there are no IEDs present when soldiers arrive at an unsecured destination. The drill is designed to:

- reduce risk from IEDs;
- promote situational awareness;
- demonstrate an alert attitude
- demonstrate an alert attitude to discourage insurgents from placing IEDs.

Sequence:

- Select location to stop..
- Post top cover sentry
- Searchers exit the vehicle
- 5 m search.
- 25 m search
- Search completion.





The 5Cs

- 1 - Confirm
- 2 - Clear
- 3 - Call
- 4 - Cordon
- 5 - Control

Confirm

The first step in the '5Cs' drill is to confirm that there is sufficient likelihood of an IED being present to justify a specialist operation.

The definition of 'confirm' can be no more prescriptive than 'when the observer is satisfied it is an IED.'

Avoid the natural curiosity of wanting to '**over-confirm**'. This can be risky. It is also natural that the local commander will want to see the suspect IED for himself to justify any decision that will initiate a clearance operation. However, this should be resisted if there is risk of the local commander becoming a casualty.



Clear

Having confirmed the presence of a probable IED, the next step is to clear people away to a safe distance.

What makes for a 'safe' distance depends on the size of the IED main charge, any enhancements, cover provided by the surrounding environment, and how much risk can be tolerated.

IEDs cause casualties by blast over-pressure, fire, fragments, and falling debris from buildings, e.g. glass and roof tiles.

The severity of injury from a fragment also reduces with distance. So the risks of injury fall very quickly with distance from an IED explosion..



Call

When the presence of a probable IED has been confirmed, the local commander should inform his higher headquarters of the situation and request assistance.

When calling consider the following:

- Who
- When
- Where
- What
- Activity
- Friendly Forces situation
- Requests
- Ingress (safe routes to ICP)
- Contact details.
- Additional information (if available)

W	Who	<i>Unit or callsign of person involved in incident.</i>
W	When	<i>Date/time. When did the incident occur?</i>
W	Where	<i>Where did the incident occur? Grid reference of IED/UXO/ICP/Contact.</i>
W	What	<i>What happened or was found (Contact/Explosion/Find)?</i>
A	Activity	<i>What activity led to the event/find?</i>
F	Friendly Forces Situation	<i>Casualties, Hazards present or protective measures taken (cordons)?</i>
R	Requests	<i>Police/QRF/EOD/Medevac etc.</i>
I	Ingress	<i>What is the safe route to the ICP?</i>
C	Contact Details	<i>Email address/phone number of person submitting report.</i>
A	Additional Details	<i>Any other information relating to the incident or situation. P – Power Source I - Initiator E – Explosive material C - Container E - Enhancements S - Switches</i>

Cordon

Having cleared an area around the probable IED, the local commander should create a cordon to control access. Civilians would not normally be allowed into the cleared area. A robust cordon is an essential element of the operation in order to:

- Prevent unauthorised entry.
- Ensure the safety of all persons .
- Prevent tampering/removal of the item.
- Prevent/deter Command IED or other direct attacks.
- Preserve forensic evidence.



Control

Stop all personnel or vehicles from entering the cleared area. Do not allow anything to disturb the area near the suspected explosive device.

Facilitate the passage of lines of the EOD team to conduct the intervention on the suspected explosive device. Local security patrols can be organized. Designate and search the helicopter landing area if needed. Maintain observation of the area surrounding the suspected explosive device.

An Incident Control Point (ICP) should be established by the Incident Commander on the scene.

Selection of ICP criteria:


- In a safe and unpredictable location.
- At a safe distance from the incident, dictated by the ground.
- ICP location must be checked.
- A secondary ICP location should be considered.
- Never use the same ICP location twice.





The 5Cs

First Response to an EO/IED Call Out





Questions?



Quiz

1. What are the 5Cs?
 - *Confirm, Clear, Call, Cordon, Control.*

2. What are the conditions that enable selection of an Incident Control Point (ICP)
 - ✓ In a safe and unpredictable location.
 - ✓ At a safe distance from the incident, dictated by the ground.
 - ✓ ICP location must be checked.
 - ✓ A secondary ICP location should be considered.
 - ✓ Never use the same ICP location twice.



2.4 Local Cultures and Influences in ERW/IED Laden Environments



Enabling Learning Objectives

Analyze generic local cultures and their potential influences within an ERW/IED laden environment.

Why it is important ?:

- IEDs need to be found and dealt with safely before they find us
- *How do we find them?*
- **By training and educating** all personnel who are required to operate in an IED threat environment:
 - What to look out for that may indicate presence of an IED
 - Know the culture and behaviour of environment they operate
 - Know how to react if something suspicious is seen
- This is achieved through robust training along with ensuring there is the appropriate flow of IED information to all personnel required to operate in an IED threat environment.





Behaviour

Local behaviour can give a lot of clues about minefields, UXO-contaminated areas or possible IED attacks.

Environment

- Environment is also referred as **atmospherics**. It is a description of the mood or feeling created by awareness of the environment.
- It's synonymous with expression "absence of the normal and presence of the abnormal". Examples
 - Presence of fewer people in a locality than normal.
 - Presence of more people in a locality than normal.
 - People acting suspiciously or paying undue attention.
 - Lack of traffic when it would normally be present.
 - Sequence of persons, possibly spotters, using mobile phones while watching security forces.





Threat Actors

Introduction:

An open mind and close eye on intelligence reports in your area of operation is needed to ensure safe accomplishment of mission goals.

Perpetrators can be:

- State Sponsored
- Non-State Armed Groups





Threat Actors

Threat Actor – Causes:

- Intimidation
- International attention
- Local/Internal social standing
- Cultural tolerance of violence
- Perceived illegitimacy of state
- Religious beliefs
- Nationalism
- Mental health
- Financial support for family





Threat Actors

Resourcing

Obtain Funding

Develop Operations

Gather and Provide
(Material/Personnel)

Improve Concept of
Operations, Tactics and Devices

Plan Attack

Observe and Evaluate

Egress/Evade Capture

Disseminate Information
and Propaganda

Feedback and Iteration



Questions?



Quiz

1. Is there a time when IEDs should not be a concern?

- *An IED attack or an ambush cannot be excluded, at any time.*

2. What are two reasons why a group or individual may choose to employ IEDs?

- *Intimidation, International Attention, Local/Internal Social Standing, Cultural Tolerance of Violence, Perceived Illegitimacy of State, Religious Beliefs, Nationalism, Mental Health, Financial Support for Family.*



Quiz

3. What is the definition of operating environment?

- *The operating environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.*



2.5 Tactical Response to IED/Mine Strike (Mounted and Dismounted) and Notional Requirements From Higher Headquarters



Enabling Learning Objectives

Describe IED/Mine Strike incident response procedures and notional requirements from higher headquarters.



Mission Variables

- Planned v. emergency response
- Each mission has different considerations





Mission Variables

Mission variable determine:

- Type of tools required
- Actions on scene
- Support needed to accomplish the mission



Response Considerations

- Type of EOD Support required
- Response times
- Dedicated EOD team security
- EOD support to Route Clearance Teams
- Mounted v. Dismounted Operations
- Counter-RCIED (CREW)



IED Response Requirements

In addition to the 5Cs:

- ICP should have own cordon in place
- Unknown persons escorted
- ID checked and possible search
- All witnesses should be searched
- Check baggage and equipment outside of ICP
- Procedures apply to mounted and dismounted responses



IED Emergency Procedures

IED Find





IED Emergency Procedures

IED Explosion





IED Emergency Procedures

IED – Blow Through





IED Emergency Procedures

IED – Immobilization





Minestrike Response Requirements



Dismounted:

- **M** Stop all Movement
- **I** Inform others
- **N** Note the area
- **E** Evaluate
- **D** Do not move, wait for help



Mine Strike Response

Mounted:

- **M** Movement stops Immediately
- **I** Inform others
- **N** Note the area
- **E** Evaluate
- **D** Do not move





Notional HQ Support

- Establish policy and distribution of IED-TM assets
- Monitor workloads and priorities
- Act as POC for intelligence coordination
- Establish communication guidelines for all assets
- Coordinate supporting activities



Questions?



Quiz

1. How can IEDD team response times be reduced?
 - *Provide them with a dedicated security element.*
2. Where should bags found during an incident response be inspected?
 - *Away from the ICP.*
3. Should vehicles move to the side of the road after a mine strike?
 - *No.*



2.6 Issuing a Threat Assessment to Tactical Force



Enabling Learning Objectives

Discuss considerations for issuing a threat assessment to tactical force.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

- Threat assessment is undertaken to establish situational awareness of the environment into which the movement is planned and in doing so determines **potential threats** and **effective hazard control measures** to mitigate such threats.
- Mission Commander's threat assessment has the following briefing paragraphs:
 - Preliminaries
 - Situation Paragraph
 - **Friendly Forces**
 - **Hostile Elements & Threats**
 - Threats in general
 - IED Threat in detail
 - VA/VP Assessment
 - **Local Populace**
- It requires the information/intelligence G 2(int) , G 3 (Operation), G 5 (Plans), G 9 (CIMIC) and IED advisor personnel on all aspects of these three sub-paragraphs. It can be effectively and systematically be done through the examination of a number of questions (estimate process)

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Prelims Paragraph

1. Determine Light Data
 - First Light and Last Light Timings
2. Determine Terrain Data/Ground analysis
 - Types of terrain you will be operating in
 - Consequences of this on your deployment – advantages & disadvantages
3. Determine Weather Data for the expected period of deployment
 - Expected Weather Conditions
 - Leading up to, during and after the expected period of deployment
 - Consequences of this on your deployment
 - Ask the Question “*so what?*” – “*how does this impact our deployment?*”
 - e.g. Rainy season and road conditions
4. Additional Kit or Equipment Requirements
 - Identify all additional kit and equipment requirements due to expected light, terrain and weather conditions in the deployment area

Environmental factors and Ground

1. Environmental factors

- First Light and Last Light Timings
- Weather (rainfall patterns of the year).
 - Leading up to, during and after the expected period of deployment
- Consequences of this on your deployment
 - Ask the Question “so what?” – “how does this impact our deployment?”
 - e.g. Rainy season and road conditions
- Temperature
- Wind

2. Terrain Data/Ground analysis

- Type of terrain movement will occur.
 - Observation
 - Cover and concealment
 - Obstacles
 - Consequences of this on your deployment – advantages & disadvantages



Friendly Forces

1. Examine the area of deployment and the likely route(s) to be travelled.
 - Grid location of FOB.
 - Name
 - Contacts
 - Ongoing and future operations.
 - Communication (Call signs)
 - Checkpoints
 - Recovery equipment availability.
 - Medical support
 - QRF
 - Specialist support availability (IEDD, EOD support)



FORWARD OPERATING BASE (FOB) DATA

	FOB NAME		DESCRIPTION	REMARKS

Hostile Threat

Examine past, current and all likely future threats along the route. The information comes from G 2.

- Name of threat actors.
- Assessed locations/disposition
- Weapon and equipment
- Tactics
- Likely courses of actions
- Assessment of strengths and weakness.
- What is the most dangerous course of action ?
- What is the most likely course of action ?
- **What's their IED threat capability ?**




IED Threat Assessment

Identify* for the area of deployment:


- Potential IED threat actors – their *modus operandi* and capabilities
- Recent IED activity in area of deployment
- Current IED threat level
- Types of IEDs in use
 - What is in use and how it is being used (Technical and Tactical)
- IED Indicators terms of:
 - **Chanelled**
 - **Aiming Markers**
 - **Ground signs**
 - **Environment**

**All of this information is typically provided by the U2 or IED advisor(s)*





IED Threat Analysis over time



Factors

- **Changes in IED incidents.**
- **Security forces activities.**
- **Resupply of IED components**
- **Rotation schedules.**
- **Weather patterns.**
- **Major operations.**

VP and VA Assessment

Common vulnerable points include

- Previous Attack Sites – IED Hotspots
- Approach to friendly locations
- Current and previously occupied positions
- Entry and exit points
- Bridges and crossing points
- Areas of canalisation
- Sharp turns
- Intersection & Junctions
- Culverts
- Slopes – uphill and downhill

- The result of a route VP assessment will be the identification of potential suitable IED attack locations on that route.
- Secondly it allows an initial assessment of the degree of vulnerability of each identified VP locations to be made.
- From this assessment, decisions can be made on the prioritisation of:
 - VP to be searched;
 - Alternative routes to be taken after a VA assessment is completed.

VP and VA Assessment

Vulnerable Point (VP)				
VP No	VP Grid Reference		Description	Remarks
	Lat	Long		
1	2.487514	44.971236	Check Point	Slow down point
2	2.613511	44.891479	CP Check Point	Slow down point
3	2.646216	44.788503	CP Check Point	Slow down point
4	2.619191	44.882549	Bridge	Slow down point, canalisation point
5	2.635873	44.825553	Bridge	Slow down point, canalization point




Vulnerable Area (VA)				
VP No	VA Grid Reference		Description	Remarks
	Lat	Long		
1	2.404114	45.013136	Area with thick vegetation which canalises convoys.	
3	2.611507	44.891752	The town is a known to harbor IED aggressor elements	Town
4	2.660653	44.706424	Near Friendly Forces location	Near FOB



Local population

- What is the assessment of the population ?
 - it may vary –
 - *Permissive* – the locals support UN
 - *Semi-permissive* – locals may or may not support UN and are unlikely to be open in any support they may have for them
 - *Non-permissive* – locals are hostile to UN and unlikely to cooperate
- Identify recent activities or events which happened between UN forces and local population*
 - Include both positive and negative activities and events, for example;
 - Recent CIMIC activities
 - Road Traffic Accident
 - Assess* whether these will have a positive or negative impact.





Quiz

1. In situation assessment, what factors do you consider?
 - *Weather and ground factors, Friendly Forces, Hostile elements, Local population.*

2. In IED threat assessment, what factors are taken into consideration?
 - *Previous incidents, Route analysis, VP and VA assessment.*




2.7 Route analysis and convoy planning procedures

Introduction

Movement planning in an IED threat environment involves:

- **Situational Assessment** – Know the following:
 - Weather and Ground factors
 - Friendly Forces
 - Hostile Elements & Threats
 - Threats
 - IED threat
 - Local Populace
- **Route Analysis** in terms of terrain and movement restrictions, hazards and associated mitigation measures required:
 - Terrain analysis – restrictions, terrain surface, seasonal considerations
 - Vulnerable points and vulnerable areas in the deployment area
- **Route Breakdown** of route to be travelled into sections with codes / names for each section and boundaries between these delineated by report lines.
- **Detailed Planning for Route Sections**



Stages of Convoy Planning and movement

1. Situational Assessment and Route analysis

Informs

2. Pre-deployment briefing and rehearsals

Informs

3. Movement

Informs


4. Post-deployment de-briefing and reporting

SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT


- Situational assessment is undertaken to establish situational awareness of the environment into which the movement is planned and in doing so determines **potential threats** and **effective hazard control measures** to mitigate such threats.
- It determines what goes in the following deployment briefing paragraphs:
 - Preliminaries
 - Situation Paragraph
 - **Friendly Forces**
 - **Hostile Elements & Threats**
 - **Threats in general**
 - **IED Threat in detail**
 - **Local Populace**
- It requires the information/intelligence G 2(int) , G 3 (Operation), G 5 (Plans), G 9 (CIMIC) and IED advisor personnel on all aspects of these three sub-paragraphs. It can be effectively and systematically be done through the examination of a number of questions (estimate process)

Route analysis

- This can involve plotting of all information from the situational assessment on a map in terms of
 - Friendly Force locations
 - Hostile elements locations, areas of activity and freedom of movement
 - Recent hostile activity
 - Previous IED attack locations
 - Local support or hostility
 - Terrain analysis.



Route analysis (sample)



□ Terrain

- Its a 63 km stretch with sparse vegetation in some section but other sections with thick vegetaion.
- Generally flat, open terrain with sparse vegetation.
- Rural setting with various villages along the route.

□ Condition of the road

- The road surface is degraded due to long periods of not being repaired.
- Potholes on the road surface provides areas for possible IED emplacement.
- Motorists create secondary routes to avoid road sections that are dilapidated.

□ IED incidents Jan 2018-Jan 2020

- **34** IED incidents reported on MSR between village Bur and Bay.
- The following locations have reported increased IED incidents close to the following areas; **El Au uegher, Salag, Dhanbalka, Daynuuney , Aborko, Daabale and Buur**
- 3 complex attacks, 20 IED exploded and 11 IED found
- 4 IEDs have targeted Friendly Forces and 14 IED targeted Host Nation Security

□ Casualties

- XX UN casualties (xx injured, x killed)
- Xx Host Nation Force casualties (xx injured and xx killed).
- x civilians' casualties (x injured, x killed).

Route Breakdown

Depending with the details, the route can further be broken down to segments e.g. between one FOB and another FOB. It is necessary to ideally plan for each of the following in that section of route:

- **Alternative route(s)** to the primary route should it be blocked.
- **RV locations** in case of movement separation.
- **ERV locations** for refuge in case of attack and separation.
- Friendly force medical stations with capabilities known.
- **HLS identified** in case of CASEVAC requirement.
- **QRF response** options.
- Vehicle recovery options.
- IED defeat capability options.

If any of these mitigation control measures are not available in a given route section, the actions-on for that section of the route need to be determined *e.g. more than one adjacent sections may use the same ERV or medical evacuation point.*

VP and VA Assessment

Vulnerable Point (VP)				
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- The result of a route VP assessment will be the identification of potential suitable IED attack locations on that route.
- Secondly it allows an initial assessment of the degree of vulnerability of each identified VP locations to be made.
- From this assessment, decisions can be made on the prioritisation of:
 - VP to be searched;
 - Alternative routes to be taken after a VA assessment is completed.

Briefing

- Use the simply the briefing format
- The briefing format consists of
 1. Preliminaries
 2. Situation
 3. Mission
 4. Execution
 5. Service Support
 6. Command and Signals



Pre-Deployment Preparation, Checks and Rehearsals

REHEARSAL REHEARSAL REHEARSAL

- Actions on IED Incident
 - IED Pre-seen / found
 - IED explosion
 - Vehicle recovery
- Actions on Ambush / Complex attack
- CASEVAC Drill
- Actions on unplanned stops – 5 & 25m checks with 360° 3D situational awareness
- Actions on all other assessed requirements – breakdown, tyre change & road traffic accident.
- Actions on VP Searches
- Actions on Destination / Objective(s)
- Actions on Separation




“Fail to Prepare and Prepare to Fail!”

Pre-Deployment Preparation, Checks and Rehearsals

- Establish and maintain comms rear link to HQ.
- Establish inter-vehicle communications
- Test back up comms
- Check other comms and tracking equipment e.g. GPS Tracker
- Check ECM is loaded and active or ready to be activated
- Check medic / trauma bags and other medical equipment
- Spare water
- Maps and GPS (loaded if required)
- Warning signs – hazard triangle
- Tow ropes and spare tyres with wheel jack and spare POL as required
- Spare Batteries for all above mentioned items

Pre-Deployment Preparation, Checks and Rehearsals

- Order of movement
- Location of security, command group, ECM, EOD team contract lift
- Distance maintained between vehicles.
- Halt



Movement

MOVEMENT PLANNING VP & VA Searches

For every movement, plan the time required for VA & VP checks

- Brief personnel on identified VA & VP locations on route
- Plan for extra VA & VP checks to break patterns or where unsure of area.
- Establish a safe stop short point and secure it with 5 & 25m checks
- Search team execute check with rest of personnel observing the surroundings
- Equipment
 - Detectors
 - Binoculars
 - ECM if available

Movement

Actions during movement

- 5s & 25s if unsecure location
- Security and observation during movement.
- Estimate time spent at location and inform all personnel
 - RV / Emergency RV / Unplanned Stops
- Arrival Drills
- ECM use during movement
- Contact Rearlink HQ
- Civilian vehicles on convoy during movement



Movement

Route Back

- Vary route from route out – Do NOT set patterns
 - Many attacks happen to returning vehicle movements
- Contact Rear Link HQ – request for any info updates.
- Real time int / ops brief on new and emerging info prior to departing
- Determine route back informing all drivers & navigators – use code word(s)
- Inform Rearlink HQ using codeword of your departure and route to be taken
- Operate in same manner for return as outward route with route in sections and same actions taken



Post-Deployment Debriefing and Reporting

- Base Entry Drill
- Security and observation
- ECM Shut-Down Drill
- Communicate to Rearlink HQ of arrival
- Unload Weapons
- After Action Review
 - Pre-deployment Issues
 - Incidents / events / suspicious activity route out, at objective(s) and route back
 - Recommendations for SOP, drills and actions on, equipment, route travelled etc.
 - Any information received that may be of interest
- Return all Equipment and weapons to storage when serviced

Commanders Encourage ALL Personnel to Speak Up During Debriefs



Quiz

1. In situation assessment, what factors do you consider?
 - *Weather and ground factors, Friendly Forces, Hostile elements, Local population.*

2. In IED threat assessment, what factors are taken into consideration?
 - *Previous incidents, IED indicators, VP and VA assessment.*



2.8 Information flow, reporting of IED threat, analysis and exploitation



Enabling Learning Objectives

Understand the importance of reporting, event analysis, enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and exploitation of IED events.



To understand IED threat, the following is required

Process

- Recording
- Reporting
- Exploitation
- Evidence preservation



Reporting

- IED Report

Improvised Explosive Device Form v.1.3


1 General Information			
^{1.1} IMSMA ID	^{1.2} IED ID	^{1.3} Date of Report	15/12/2019 DDMMYYYY
^{1.4} Organisation	UNMAS	^{1.4} if other please explain	
^{1.5} Reported By (Unit, Team)	Other	^{1.5} if other please explain	UNMAS OPS/QA
^{1.6} Reported By (Name)		^{1.7} Reviewed by (Role, Org)*	UNMAS RAC GAO
^{1.8} UNMAS Mentored Task*	No	^{1.9} if Mentored Task No	
2 Verification Information			
^{2.1} Verified By	UNMAS JOC OPS	^{2.2} Date of Verification	15/12/2019 DDMMYYYY
3 Incident Information			
^{3.1} Type of Incident	Explosion	^{3.2.1} Date of Incident*	02/12/2019
		^{3.2.2} Time	7 Hours 0 Minutes
^{3.3} Status	Detonated	^{3.4} Found by	
		^{3.5} Unit	
^{3.6} Neutralized / Collected by		^{3.7} if other please explain	
^{3.8} Incident Sub Type		^{3.8.1} IED	
		^{3.8.2} Explosion	Command
		^{3.8.3} ID#	
	^{3.8.4} Explosive device type confirmed or suspected	^{3.8.5} Mine	
	Suspected	^{3.8.6} Total Number of Devices in incident*	1
^{3.9} Description of Incident (Before, During, After)* FACT only			

Recording Number and delivery DTG		RADIO MESSAGE	
— UPON ABOVE — THIS — LINE — RESERVED — TO — SIGNAL SOLDIER —			
ORIGINAL AUTHORITY	DATE-TIME-GROUP	TOP SECRET	FLASH
FHQ MINUSMA		SECRET	VERY URGENT
TO		CONFIDENTIAL	Urgent Operation
INFO		RESTRICTED	URGENT
		UNCLASSIFIED	ROUTINE
			DIFFERE
TEXT: EOD 10-LINER REPORT (ENGLISH)			
Serial	Heading	Information	
(a)	(b)	(c)	
1	DTG OF INCIDENT / FIND		
2	GRID OF INCIDENT:		
3	DESCRIPTION OF SCENE / SUSPECTED ITEMS	UXO:	
		IED:	



IED Fusion

All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU)







Information Sharing & Coordination- Force HQ's




Type Of IED Incidents



IED INCIDENTS TYPE BY SECTOR



IED INCIDENT LOCATIONS



IED INCIDENTS



INCIDENT CASUALTY RATE PER ASSESSED TARGET

0.00	3.93	0.00
AMISOM	SSF	Non-Security

Fatalities by IEDs


AMISOM	SSF	CIVILIANS	BELLIGERENT
0	26	20	1

Injuries by IEDs

AMISOM	SSF	CIVILIANS	BELLIGERENT
1	41	23	0

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


IED Incidents Status




TOP ASSESSED TARGETS



TOP TARGET TYPES



Incident Area



Day of the week






Enemy TTP Analysis

TTP Analysis

- Enemy capability, intent, and ground use determine both enemy's TTPs and Force Protection (FP) vulnerabilities.
- Enemy TTP analysis
- Develop strategies to limit the damage of IEDs.






Threats & Trends


Threats & Trends

- IED threat is an evolutionary threat.
- Retains relevance through ingenuity in manufacturing and deployment methods.
- Easy access to IED making methods (mainly online), low tech IEDs can transcend into high-tech.




Exploitation

- Exploitation activities:
 - Documents, photographs, computers and other information storage media.
 - Weapons and equipment, IEDs and components
 - Forensic evidence and biometric data



Exploitation

- Exploitation activities:
 - Documents, photographs, computers and other information storage media.
 - Weapons and equipment, IEDs and components.



Exploitation

- Exploitation activities
- Key considerations
 - Technical intelligence
 - Biometric data:
 - Evaluation
 - Timely review.
 - Training upgrades.
 - Capability development.
 - Equipment acquisition.




Exploitation

- Exploitation activities
- Key considerations
 - Technical intelligence
 - Biometric data:
 - Evaluation
 - Maintenance of capability
 - Information activities



Exploitation

- Exploitation concept
- Key considerations
- Exploitation activities
 - Level 1
 - Level 2
 - Level 3





Quiz

1. In order to understand IED threat in Area of Operations, what is required ?
 - *IED recording, reporting, analysis, exploitation and evidence preservation.*
2. What is the benefit of understanding enemy TTPs?
 - *By properly analyzing the enemies TTPs, UN forces can work to develop strategies to limit the damage of IEDs.*
3. Explain the different levels of IED exploitation?
 - *Level 1, 2 and 3*



Questions?

An aerial photograph showing a long, single-file line of various trucks and vehicles on a dirt road that stretches across a vast, dry, and open landscape. The terrain is flat and sparsely vegetated with small, scattered trees and shrubs. The sky is clear and bright. The text 'QUESTIONS?' is overlaid in the top left corner, and 'THANK YOU' is overlaid in the bottom center.

QUESTIONS?

THANK YOU



IED-Threat Mitigation Concepts





Terminal Learning Objectives

Each student will understand and discuss IED-TM fundamentals and cycle.



Overview

3.1 Introduction to IED- Threat Mitigation (TM) and IED- TM strategy

3.2 IED Threat Integration in UN Mission



3.1 Introduction to IED- Threat Mitigation and IED- Strategy

IED Threat Mitigation Vs CIED:

IED Threat Mitigation:

- IED Threat Mitigation (IED-TM) is used to denote the scope of activities undertaken by the United Nations in Missions where IEDs impact mandate delivery.
- IED-TM is a whole of UN approach which focuses on the physical, procedural, or training responses which can collectively be applied to mitigate the threats posed by IEDs. The UN does not focus on the kinetic, offensive tactics associated with attacking IED networks which are the hallmark of military strategies.

C-IED:

- C-IED is a whole of government approach which focuses on the three pillars of defeat the device, train the force (prepare the force) and attack the network

IED-THREAT MITIGATION VS C-IED:

C-IED

- Attack the Network
- Defeat the Device
- Preface the Force

*Contemporary
Military Approach*


IED Threat Mitigation

- Degrade the Network (DtN)
- Defeat the Device (DtD)
- Training Education & Doctrine (TED)


UNMAS Approach

IED-THREAT MITIGATION VS C-IED:


The C-IED approach – Pillars of activity



IED-THREAT MITIGATION VS C-IED:




VS




IED TM Strategy

- Operational framework
 - IED Threat mitigation concept




IED TM Strategy

- Operational framework
- Threat mitigation objectives




IED TM Strategy

- Operational framework
- Threat mitigation objectives
- Conceptual contours




IED TM Strategy

- Operational framework
- Threat mitigation objectives
- Conceptual contours



IED TM Strategy

- Operational framework
- Threat mitigation objectives
- Conceptual contours
- Phases of IED TM





3.2 IED Threat Integration in UN Mission

“ In battles and in fights, the United Nations needs to win, or troops, police and civilian personnel will die.”

Cruz Report

IED TM HQ Integration


- Planning and coordinating IED threat mitigation in the UN mission
 - Minimum threat level
 - Low threat level
 - Medium threat level
 - High threat level



IED TM HQ Integration


Factors determining the IED-TM Force structure

- Manpower
- Expertise
- Equipment
- Information
- Support



IED TM HQ Integration

- Staff functions contributing to IED TM
 - Targeting
 - Information
 - ISR
 - Intelligence Fusion
 - Search
 - IEDD
 - Exploitation
 - Operations
 - Plans
 - CIMIC
 - Training





Force Headquarters (FHQ) Responsibility

FHQ is required to carry out detailed assessment of the IED threat in the mission area through intelligence collection effort and identification of uniformed capability requirements for undertaking the IED mitigation effort.



Staff Functions and Tasks


Key Tasks:

- Designate IED advisor
- Establish IED-TM cells
- Employ IED-TM units
- Standardize reporting
- Issue operating guidelines




IED TM HQ Integration – Command and Control

- IED Advisor
 - Advise and assist
 - Control and coordinate
 - Advise on IED training to units
 - Explosive hazard information
 - Assist mission commanders
 - Advise on FPECM matters




IED TM HQ Integration – Command and Control

- IED TM Cells
 - Intelligence Cell
 - Assess the IED threat.
 - Develop and disseminate IED information
 - Identify intelligence.
 - Recommend FP measures




IED TM HQ Integration – Command and Control

- IED TM Cells
 - Intelligence Cell
 - Operations Cell
 - Synchronize IED activities.
 - Track and log developments
 - Coordinate C-IED activities
 - Plan exploitation operations
 - IEDD capacity-building



IED TM HQ Integration – Command and Control

- IED TM Cells
 - Intelligence Cell
 - Operations Cell
 - CIMIC and Information Cell
 - Coordination with civil departments,
 - Plan and conduct influence activities
 - IED awareness



IED TM HQ Integration – Command and Control

- IED TM Cells
 - Intelligence Cell
 - Operations Cell
 - CIMIC and Information Cell
 - Training and evaluation cell
 - Prepare training plans
 - Provide guidance
 - IEDD training evaluation.
 - IEDD force operational readiness.



IED TM HQ Integration – Command and Control

- Liaison
 - Mission partner, national C-IED organizations
 - Military and police HQ
 - Mission component HQs
 - T/PCCs HQs



Source: UNMAS



IED-TM Units

- Search teams
- EOD teams





IED-TM Unit Tasks

- Route clearance
- Urban area clearance
- Area clearance
- Entry Point Search
- Disposal of explosive ordnance finds





Standardized Monitoring & Reporting

Develops Overall Picture of:

- Threat/hazard Situation
- Location of IEDs / EO
- IEDs found during mission
- EO type, quantity and incident site
- Residual risk
- IED intelligence
- Force workload
- Archival information



Operating Guidelines

Considerations:

- Preventative actions
- Render Safe Procedures (RSP)





Quiz

1. What are the recommended cell that should be established to support IED-TM?

– *Intelligence, Operations, CIMIC & Information Management, Training & Evaluation.*

2. What are the aspirations information sharing and coordination?

– *Enhanced Situational Awareness, Supports IED-TM Campaign, Builds on Trust and Mutual Respect.*



Quiz

3. What does standardized monitoring and reporting develop an overall picture of?

- *(Threat / Hazard Situation), (Location of IEDs / EO), (IEDs found during Missions), (EO type, quantity and incident site), (Residual Risk), (IED Intelligence), (Force Workload), (Archival Information).*



Questions?